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Sartre was extremely fond of drawing on the example of the actor in order to illustrate 
some of his key philosophical preoccupations. Most controversially, in his early 
masterpiece, Being and Nothingness, he exploits the actor’s ‘mechanical gestures’ 
when playing Hamlet to shed light on the attitude of ‘mauvaise foi’ – acting in bad 
faith. Prima facie this is hardly surprising. It is well known that the actor’s is an 
ambiguous case, ethically speaking. Insofar as his mode of behaviour is to imitate 
behaviour he does not act but only appears to do so. Sartre, in 1939, observes: ‘an 
actor imitates joy, sorrow, etc, without being joyful or sorrowful, his behaviour is 
addressed to a fictional world. He imitates behaviour but is not himself behaving’.1 
Now if that were all Sartre had to say on the matter then nothing would particularly 
distinguish his from a host of similar jejune views on acting. Yet it is soon evident 
that Sartre has much to say on the subject that is of contemporary interest – and 
specifically regarding the problem of what exactly it is that the actor is doing when 
they act. My aim in this article is to substantiate this claim by exploiting Sartre in two 
ways. Firstly, it is to extrapolate from his scattered remarks on the actor an ‘existential 
ontology’ of mimetic performance – what I will call (following Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe2) an ‘onto-mimetology’.  The second aim is to use this reconstruction in 
order to test the potency of Sartre’s analogy of the actor with the situation of bad 
faith. My contention is that once we have grasped the problem of acting from a 
Sartrean perspective, the analogy is, first, by no means as unambiguous as he assumes 
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and, second, intriguing for the light it casts on Sartre’s existential interpretation of 
freedom. 
 
Sartre’s Contribution to an ‘Onto-mimetology’ 
As I understand it, onto-mimetology involves an analysis of the phenomenon of 
mimesis in terms of the being for whom mimesis is a fundamental possibility: ‘man’. 
Sartre never uses the term ‘mimesis’ – he speaks, instead, of the ‘Imaginary’ – though 
with the same phenomenon in view. The Imaginary defines for Sartre an ‘attitude of 
consciousness’: it makes the imaginary object present to consciousness through – as 
Sartre terms it – an ‘image function’.3 This function has, as he says elsewhere, an 
‘irrealising’ utility, which allows us to transcend the real by ‘nihilating’ what is, thus 
opening up the fields of possibility and alterity. Sartre concludes: ‘It is the appearance 
of the imaginary before consciousness that allows us to grasp that the nihilation of the 
world is its essential condition and its primary structure’4 - and:  ‘There could be no 
realising consciousness without imaging consciousness, and vice versa. Thus 
imagination, far from appearing as an accidental characteristic of consciousness, is 
disclosed as an essential and transcendental condition of consciousness’.5 
It is because the mimetic function is described by Sartre as an essential and 
transcendental condition of consciousness that we can specify the task assigned to an 
onto-mimetology as describing (a) the ontological conditions for the possibility of 
specific modes of mimetic activity – for instance ‘acting’ – founded on (b) the more 
fundamental mode of mimetic comportment that defines human existence in general. 
In this way a theatrical mimetology gives way to a general mimetology. Allow me to 
explain by distinguishing the two modes of mimesis that will be of concern to us – 
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one a ‘derivative’ theatrical mode of mimesis, the other, ‘originary mimesis’, as I 
shall call it.  
In contrast to standard Platonic-Aristotelian derived notions of mimesis – the 
art of representation or imitation – originary mimesis refers to a praxical activity. 
Mimesis is here a performative act not to be confused with the mimetic object: a 
portrait, a characterisation, an image, a representation. Nor is it to be conflated with a 
mimetic consciousness in the sense of an explicit second order consciousness of the 
image as image. Originary mimesis describes what it is like to be ‘us’: we are 
inveterate ‘mimeticians’. Specifically, we represent ourselves to ourselves through the 
medium of action – or, as Sartre says, through our projects. It is only by acting in the 
world that we arrive at an understanding of who we are. This does not mean that 
Sartre thinks we possess an explicit consciousness of this activity. Quite the reverse, 
such a consciousness is inchoative and reflexive. It is the Imaginary as embodied in 
our practical behaviour; meaning for Sartre: our self-conceptions are not fixed 
actualities but rather ways of projecting ourselves as possibilities. This is exemplified 
by the way we press into certain ways of being that make sense to us and make sense 
of us as situated beings. Sartre does not say that we are only our possibilities, since 
these practiced ways of being through which we are realised as embodied agents are 
grounded in what he calls our ‘facticity’, which connects us to the world and with the 
past.   
More disconcertingly: originary mimesis reveals that an ineliminable 
contingency belongs to the self. After all, if general mimesis describes a basic 
comportment belonging to a being whose aim is to exist according to some 
determinate self-conception – to see oneself as a teacher, a family man, an artist, a 
revolutionary, or whatever – then to the extent that we realise ourselves only in the 
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manner of something tacitly aimed at, we must also acknowledge that in being it we 
are not it. ‘I am the self which I will be’, says Sartre, ‘in the mode of not being it’.6 
Originary mimesis thus describes the self as a comportmental activity that is always 
thrust beyond itself. It describes human existence in terms of self-transcendence – or 
as Sartre otherwise expresses it, in terms of ‘freedom’. Freedom is my power to 
‘nihilate’ what I have been for the sake of realising what I will be. 
Now it is by pursuing this Sartrean line of enquiry into originary mimesis that 
we can begin to see how mimesis more narrowly construed as theatrical mimesis 
might be understood as a derivative and founded phenomenon.  If this ‘derivation’ is 
best exemplified through an analysis of theatrical mimesis, and specifically through 
the ontology of the actor, it is because, in contrast to the other arts, theatrical mimesis 
incorporates into its very existence the imaging attitude Sartre describes.  Let us 
consider the evidence for this by venturing the following idea: the play is not the 
representation of an action, performed by the actors. It is only in the particular en-
acting by the actor of a representative function of the text. It is action itself; and it is 
just what the actor does. The actor embodies this mimetic function in his ‘playing’, 
‘acting’ and ‘doing’, not by stepping into the shoes of a ready-made character, but in 
the ‘gestic’ mode of an ‘actant’.  I use this term loosely borrowed from Greimas (it is 
certainly not Sartrean) to distinguish on the one hand the person of the actor from the 
role, the fictional character; and, on the other, to avoid speaking of the actor’s role in 
terms of portraying that ‘character’.  By actant, I mean a form of understanding which 
fuses the actor and role into a new facticity.  In the case of the actor who plays Hamlet 
it is through the ‘Hamlet-actant’ which becomes a way of being for the actor that 
Hamlet himself is realised and the actor, in Sartre’s words, irrealised (irréalise). 
What makes this mimetic substitution possible, according to Sartre, depends on the 
 5 
ability of the actor to use his own body, experience and sensibility as an analogon for 
the sake of manifesting a phantasm. 
To grasp what this means, consider Sartre’s interpretation of the well-observed 
puzzle of the actor, and in particular, his engagement with Diderot’s treatise on acting 
– Paradoxe sur le comédien. Diderot expresses the paradox of the actor when he 
observes: ‘Great poets, great actors, and, I may add, all great copyists of Nature, in 
whatever art, beings gifted with fine imagination, with broad judgement, with 
exquisite tact, with a sure touch of taste, are the least sensitive of all creatures’.7 The 
paradox is this: in order to move us, the actor must be unmoved. Diderot reflects: ‘All 
these emotions he has given you.  The actor is tired, you are unhappy; he has had 
exertion without feeling, you feeling without exertion’.8 And he goes on to add: 
‘Were it otherwise the player’s lot would be the most wretched on earth: but he is not 
the person he represents; he plays it, and plays it so well that you think he is the 
person; the deception is all on your side; he knows well enough that he is not the 
person’.9 
Sartre agrees with Diderot, of course – when we attend a performance of 
Hamlet what we expect to see is not the actor’s anguish but that of the Prince of 
Denmark. Remarking on the great Shakespearean actor Edmund Kean, Sartre writes 
‘[he] draws his pride in the fact that he would not be admired for “being” the 
character so well unless everyone, starting precisely with himself, knew that he was 
not’.10 Sartre also says, however – and this would seem to be a departure from 
Diderot’s view – ‘No one can act a play without permitting himself to be totally and 
publicly devoured by the imaginary’.11 For the actor there is no evading the paradox; 
his whole being is implicated in it. Moreover, in contrast to Diderot, for whom the 
actor is seen to require judgement over emotion, for Sartre, the great actor is not and 
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cannot be the man without sentiment. But nor is the actor’s emotion the same as his 
character’s. Rather, he uses his ‘sentiment’ as an analogon.  
 
Diderot is right that the actor does not really experience his character’s 
feelings; but it would be wrong to suppose that he is expressing them quite 
coldly, for the truth is that he experiences them unreally (irréellment). Let us 
concede that his real personal feelings, such as stage fright (…) serve him as 
an analogon and through them he aims at the passions that he has to express.12  
 
To appreciate the full implications of this statement we need to understand how the 
analogon, as a structure, stands at the very centre of representation. Consider first a 
straightforward example, a statue of Venus. Sculpted in marble, Venus represents an 
‘imaginary woman’ who, as Sartre says, ‘is not and never has been’.13 Nevertheless, 
we see Venus in the marble and at the expense of what is merely ‘real’: the marble is 
no longer there as a hunk of stone. Shaped and crafted by the sculptor it functions as 
an analogon of Venus. In Sartre’s view, the being of the marble is ‘subsumed’ under 
the mimetic function as a representative for the non-being of Venus.14 The analogon 
in this way acts as a material intermediary for an intentional act that seeks to 
materialise a non-existent object through it. Hence analogons ‘serve as 
representatives of the absent object, without managing however to suspend that 
characteristic of the objects of an imaging consciousness: absence’.15 The analogon 
can never make what it represents ‘real’, and yet it gives the absent object in the 
manner of a perceptible thing.   
Analogons are also infused with a social or intersubjective character, as Sartre 
again explains: the ‘inert being of the stone exists for the purpose of derealizing itself 
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publicly by derealizing its beholders’.16 The stone statue is said to be of Venus only 
because it draws those who contemplate it into the symbolic space of the irreal opened 
by the power of the Imaginary. Correlatively, this tells us that the analogon derives its 
representative power from a cultural space that invests it with meaning.  
How does this analysis of the analogon bear on our understanding of the actor 
and the structure of theatrical mimesis in general? Let us first consider the claim that 
the actor can only become an analogon of Hamlet because the theatrical spectacle 
induces a ‘collective unrealisation’.17 The significance of which is surely this: the 
audience is also thoroughly implicated in the paradox of the actor, since the 
achievement of the actor’s self-derealisation is gained at the expense of the 
unrealisation of the audience. The great actor, for instance, excites us to entertain a 
kind of ‘quasi belief’ – or as Sartre says a belief that is already ‘neutralised’. A 
neutralised belief might be thought of as a species of false belief which, despite our 
consciousness of its falsity, is one we are nonetheless willing to tolerate for the sake 
of sustaining the fiction. It permits us to believe the following for example: that 
Hamlet intends to seek revenge for his father’s murder, that he devises a cunning plan 
to expose Claudius and that he accidentally kills Polonius. Still, we never believe that 
there was a murder, and still less that the actor is licensed to wreak actual bloody 
revenge in Hamlet’s name. The actor cannot convince us that the spectacle is real. On 
the contrary, ‘mimetic’ belief is generated as an effect of the Imaginary and 
incorporates within it only one certainty: that it is not true. ‘Kean is not Hamlet’, 
Sartre tells us, ‘and he knows it and knows that we know it’ – and he goes on to add: 
‘The only means [Kean] has to ensure that the play shall exist through us is to infect 
us with it’.18 But then we might well ask: how exactly does this supposedly infectious 
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power of a Kean or a Brando neutralise our disbelief and so captivate us in his fiction, 
even as we know it to be false? 
Unfortunately, Sartre’s position falls short of providing a full answer to this 
question. Still, he gives us a clue as to how to proceed and indeed we already have in 
our possession a preliminary answer thanks to him: ‘It is not that the character is 
realised in the actor, but that the actor is irrealised in the character’.19 In short, it is 
through the mimetic power of substitution. Just as the marble in the case of the statue 
of Venus substitutes its own being for the sake of presencing a non-existent goddess, 
so the actor presents himself as the analogon of a non-existent man – Hamlet. Sartre’s 
answer, then: the actor substitutes himself for Hamlet. For sure, in the case of the 
actor things are complicated by the fact that the actor is no hunk of inorganic stuff. 
Even so, Sartre insists: ‘he resembles the statue in that he is a permanent center, real 
and recognized, of unrealization (…). He musters and commits his whole self to make 
his real person the analogon of something imaginary’.20 The difference is, unlike the 
statue of Venus, the actor is both sculptor and sculpted; hence ‘his material is his 
person and his aim is to be some other person in unreality’.21   
 Here we can better appreciate the nature of Sartre’s disagreement with 
Diderot. To say the actor’s emotions become ‘irreal’, as Sartre does, is not to say that 
they are thereby entirely absent. In order for the actor to manufacture the anguish of 
Hamlet he needs to find a means of achieving this effect. Where, asks Sartre, is this 
material to be found other than in the actor’s own facticity? The actor’s skill does not 
lie in duping the audience but in transposing his experience into the new facticity 
which he is to embody. This cannot mean, pace Diderot, that for the actor there are no 
emotions present on stage; that his playing is without feeling. On the contrary, for 
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Sartre – in direct opposition to Diderot – the actor’s real sensibility is not to be 
suppressed but harnessed for the presentification of what is irreal. 
 
[It] is evident that the actor does not posit that he is Hamlet. But this does not 
signify that he is not entirely mobilized to produce Hamlet. He uses all his 
feelings, all this strength, all this gestures as analogons of the feelings and 
conduct of Hamlet. But by this very fact he irrealizes them. He lives entirely in 
an irreal world. And it matters little that he really cries in playing the role. 
These tears (…) he grasps them himself – and the public with him – as the 
tears of Hamlet, which is to say as analogons of irreal tears.22 
 
Thus whatever feeling is actually experienced provides the matter by which the actor 
concretely embodies the fiction. The actor as analogon thereby presents himself as a 
material correlate for a fictional actor who would otherwise remain an inert fiction. 
What makes the analogon possible is precisely the irrealising power of the Imaginary 
to dissolve and reconfigure the real. Applied to our specific case: it is the power 
possessed by the actor to transform himself into actant; a power that presses his real 
being into the service of an irreal, fictitious and in effect non-existent Other. 
Accordingly, if it is true, as Sartre says, that the actor will ‘never convince us’ 
of the reality of the events on stage, he nevertheless needs all his powers of persuasion 
to induce us to enter the irreal. The effect is peculiar: I see Hamlet, but I do not 
believe him to be really there in the flesh. And so my belief is almost certainly 
neutralised: it is not true belief; I do not posit Hamlet’s existence. But that is not all 
for it turns out that the actor never was trying to convince me of the reality of Hamlet 
in the first place – this, after all, is surely the self-evident compact the theatre makes 
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with its audience. What the actor requires in order to effect the transposition from real 
to irreal is simply that I believe in his acting; and thus, that I must believe in what he 
does. Hence, when the actor steps onto the stage, immediately I take up an attitude in 
his favour: I want to be convinced. Conversely, the actor’s job is to satisfy this 
demand: he does all he can to convince me of his grasp of the part by demonstrating 
his command of the imagined situation. In this sense we might think of the actor as a 
kind of ‘truth-teller’ whose job is not simply to display the fiction but to justify it. He 
performs this function in two interconnected ways. Firstly, he mobilises his entire 
being so as to constitute himself as the embodiment of an ‘empty’ proposition – a 
‘what if’. Secondly, in that irreal mode, he strives to ‘defend’ that proposition through 
his performance, and through the technique of presenting himself as an analogon. 
Believing in his acting – his ‘as if’ – I then believe in the fiction; the power of the 
second is founded on the potency of the first. 
But what implication does this have on our understanding of the paradox? Is it 
in this way, and as Sartre suggests at one point, ‘resolved’?23 Here we must disagree 
with Sartre. For the power that enchants me, that solicits my whole being to succumb 
to a state of rapturous attention – a power, moreover, that loosens the weak grip of 
mere doxic comportment – fundamentally draws its strength from the paradox. Hence 
my belief ‘in what the actor is doing’ is directed neither to the fictional figure of 
Hamlet, in whose existence I cannot believe; nor is it directed to the person of the 
actor playing him, in which case belief would remain on the side of the mundane and 
so captive to the real. Instead, it goes out to and seizes upon the Hamlet-actant – the 
actor as analogon, insofar as the Imaginary – the power of consciousness to 
‘derealise’ itself – allows me to believe in his substitution. Equally, as every actor 
must know, failure belongs to theatrical mimesis as an inverse law of the power of 
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substitution precisely because it invokes a living paradox. After all, it is because 
theatre actively invites a consciousness of this paradox that the belief of the audience 
is already constituted as implicitly treacherous. This is why, if the actor permits one 
false note to enter into his performance, theatrical mimesis is immediately shattered 
against the suppressed reality on which it rests. Notwithstanding this ever-present 
threat, the actor is willing to take his chances. Conscious of his technique, which he 
takes great care to conceal from the audience, the actor possesses the sure knowledge 
that the paradox is there to be mastered.   
 Still, mastering the paradox comes at a cost – as Sartre was to point out when 
discussing the personality of the actor, who is, he says, ‘first of all a stolen child, 
without rights, truth, and reality, a prey to some sort of vampires’.24 Let us then 
attempt to bring the paradox into view at its acutest point, since it is one thing to 
explain the structure of the paradox with reference to the belief of the audience in 
relation to the actor’s performance and quite another to speak of it with regard to the 
situation of the actor in relation to himself. The problem for the actor is this: in order 
to substitute himself for another, to use himself as an analogon, the actor must, 
according to Sartre, be able to convince himself of what he knows to be false. In other 
words, for Sartre – and he is not alone in thinking this – my faith in the actor, the 
foothold by which his being obtains traction, demands a rather more difficult act of 
faith on his part: to be credible he must believe himself to be what he is not. This 
‘act’, as we shall try to show, is in fact an operation of consciousness whose aim is to 
indeed neutralise belief, thus permitting the actor to believe in the unbelievable. How 
feasible, though, is such an act of faith? It is to this question that we must now turn 
our attention, and in doing so, reconnect theatrical mimesis to the problem of 
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originary mimesis with which we began. We shall do so by exploring the analogy 
Sartre draws between the situation of the actor and that of bad faith. 
 
The Ontology of the Actor and the Paradox of Bad Faith 
Without as yet deciding one way or the other whether the actor really is in bad faith 
we might at least note a peculiar isomorphism in the structure of belief requisite to the 
success of the actor’s performance and that of the structure of belief involved in 
Sartre’s attempt to establish the viability of bad faith: both invoke the same puzzle of 
‘self deception’. To propose the following as a working hypothesis in order to think 
this puzzle through: bad faith belongs to the being of the actor just to the extent that 
the actor employs ‘bad faith’ as the technical means of mastering the paradox of 
acting. Consider this claim in light of Sartre’s remarks on the actor and corresponding 
remarks on the problem of bad faith in Being and Nothingness: 
 
The player’s technique (…) consists primarily in using this analogon for the 
imaginary emotion which he must experience fictitiously. For feeling in the 
unreal is not failing to feel, but deliberately deceiving oneself about the 
meaning of what is being felt; indeed, the player clings to the unacknowledged 
certainty that he is not Hamlet at the very moment when he is publicly 
manifesting himself as Hamlet and for the purposes of demonstration is 
obliged to convince himself that he is Hamlet.25  
 
The true problem of bad faith stems evidently from the fact that bad faith is 
faith (…) the essential problem of bad faith is a problem of belief (…). How 
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can we believe by bad faith in the concepts which we forge expressly to 
persuade ourselves?26  
 
The puzzle, in short, boils down to the question of how anyone could consciously 
deceive themselves. So what does the structure of belief constitutive of bad faith have 
to tell us about the ontological basis of theatrical mimesis? To begin the task of 
unravelling this, we might adapt a question raised by Sartre in Being and Nothingness 
and ask: ‘What must be the being of man, if he is capable of being an actor?’ We 
might also predict in keeping with the above hypothesis that our answer to this 
question will be the same as that given by Sartre in response to the question of the 
possibility of bad faith: ‘The condition of the possibility for bad faith [and thus of 
being an actor] is that human reality, in its most immediate being, in the intrastructure 
of the pre-reflective cogito, must be what it is not and not be what it is’.27 
 To explain what this means, a quick recapitulation of Sartre’s ontology is in 
order.  Recall, for Sartre, human reality is distinguished by the peculiar two-facedness 
of man’s mode of being. On the one hand he can be seen as determined by brute 
circumstance – he is a facticity. On the other hand, he exists as a free possibility that 
has the power to ‘nihilate’ that facticity – he is a transcendence. The consequence of 
this is that man embodies a paradoxical tendency in his very being. He strives to be 
what he cannot be and cannot be what he must be.  
In other words, just as it is right to say that the actor is not Hamlet, so in 
another sense it is right to insist that he must be Hamlet if he is to be an actor. Firstly, 
if we take Hamlet to be a something realisable then the actor cannot be it; no matter 
how committed the actor may be no amount of preparation can make him Hamlet. In 
this sense Hamlet is ‘unattainable’. On the other hand, if we understand Hamlet as a 
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type of commitment that the actor can take up and press into, then not only can the 
actor ‘be’ Hamlet, he must be Hamlet if he is to be at all. To be an actor, one must 
adopt Hamlet as a way of being. What allows him to do this, moreover, owes 
everything to the stark fact that he is nothing in his being; the actor’s own being is 
‘unattainable’. In this sense Diderot was not far off the mark when he said ‘Perhaps it 
is just because he is nothing that he is before all everything’.28 In Sartrean terms, he is 
nothing because there is no such thing as a ‘propertied’ self – because a self that 
possessed a proper nature, which coincided with itself, would not be a self; it would 
be ‘en soi’ - a thing. Indeed it is only because for Sartre consciousness is nothing in 
itself – is nothingness itself – that it is always free to decide for itself who it will be: 
‘Freedom’, he tells us, ‘is the human being putting his past out of play by secreting his 
own nothingness’.29  The consequence of this freedom? – the for-itself lacks ‘a certain 
coincidence with itself (…) [it] lacks a certain particular and concrete reality (…) 
[which] would transform the for-itself into itself’.30 That's why in order for the self to 
be at all it must press into what it is not; this is the meaning of Sartre’s enigmatic 
assertion ‘[man] makes himself be’.31 His very nothingness compels him to self-
interpret via a determination that can only be his provisionally. 
To examine this peculiarity in closer detail consider once again our example of 
the relation of an actor to his role. The standard interpretation explains this relation in 
terms of the actor ‘representing’ the character through the performance of scripted 
actions. Be that as it may there is an alternative way of accounting for this relation, 
specifically by looking a little more closely at what is going on in the being of the 
actor. The idea is this: contrary to the standard interpretation, when an actor plays 
Hamlet, he is in a de facto sense being Hamlet. That is to say, there are grounds on 
which we can understand statements of the sort ‘Olivier is Hamlet’ in a non-
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metaphorical and non-hyperbolic sense. Specifically, the actor is Hamlet insofar as 
through his actions Hamlet is intended. Only by intending Hamlet in his actions is it 
then possible to say that a ‘Hamlet-effect’, a ‘theatrical representation’, is engendered 
in the minds of the audience. But observe, there are two separate issues involved here, 
however tacitly voiced. Firstly, to say that the actor is Hamlet insofar as he intends 
Hamlet is not to say that the actor is not also in another sense quite distinct from 
Hamlet. He has a distinct facticity of his own: for instance, we need not deny that the 
actor has a life that is entirely independent of his being Hamlet. Another way of 
putting this point is to say both actor and audience fully recognize the theatrical nature 
of the experience; that it involves ‘make-believe’ – an ‘as if’ world and not a real 
world. And yet on a second look I want to suggest that the actor is not just acting as if 
he were Hamlet, that is, he is not just playing Hamlet. Rather, when he acts the 
Hamlet role he plays himself as Hamlet. Hamlet in this second sense is no mere 
representation – on the contrary, the actor does not act a representation of Hamlet, he 
simply acts Hamlet. Hamlet is what we might call a ‘fictive’ identity that the actor 
assumes; an identity whose intentional threads are unified by a certain conception on 
which his gestures are trained. In performing actions relevant to the goal of being 
Hamlet, the actor becomes a placeholder for this ‘Hamlet identity’ which he inhabits 
in living it. For the actor, Hamlet is not a representation but a way-of-being. This is 
because the being of the actor is attained only in his pressing into Hamlet as a way to 
be. This interpretative content not only makes sense of being-an-actor, it makes sense 
of the being of the actor – his being thus becomes concrete.   
There is an important sense of course in which this entire proposal should be 
seen – and quite rightly so – as factitious. If we take it that being Hamlet is something 
the actor could attain in the sense of a substantive identity that would uniquely 
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distinguish him as the Hamlet, we would say the idea was either risible or that anyone 
holding such a view must be deluded, perhaps even psychotic. Commonsense is 
enough to tell us that no-one is Hamlet in that sense. What, though, is the lesson of 
this example? Well, on the one hand, I take it to lie in the distinction made here 
between the mimetic ‘as if’ of play-acting and what I have called (so as to distinguish 
it) the fictive ‘as’ of self-interpretation. The actor invokes both senses of the ‘as’ when 
playing Hamlet – the fictive and the fictional. Now admittedly the formal character of 
the fictive ‘as’ is quite obscure; so what does the fictive ‘as’ of interpretation tell us 
about who we are as selves?   
One way of putting the idea is to say that my ability to self-interpret is not 
distinct from my ability to self-identify. Interpretation occurs in identificatory acts 
through which I manifest specific commitments. Identification should not be 
understood here in its usual psychological sense (for instance, when we identify with 
someone we admire, when we secretly yearn to be that person). Rather, identification, 
in this context, signifies an operative, pre-cognitive exercising of what Sartre calls our 
having-to-be. In this sense, acts of self-identification are not reflective but 
performative. I identify myself as someone with a certain taste in music – say, 
expressing my preference for Debussy over Chopin – primarily in my listening habits. 
In short, identification occurs in the reflexive processes of self-articulation through 
doing something. Significantly, however, while the self is only in self-interpretative 
identificatory acts of the kind we have already described – Sartrean ‘projections’ – it 
is not and cannot be, in any strict sense, identical with those projects with which it 
identifies itself. On the contrary, such identities can only function – just as Hamlet 
does for the actor – as placeholders for my commitments. What this means is that we 
are all a little like the actor; we are all, each in our own way, ‘playing at being 
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Hamlet’. The difference is in our case we do tend to take the ‘fictive as’ to be rather 
more substantive than it actually is. How we self-identify indeed provides us with a 
determinate identity, but in the very determinateness of those ways-of-being by which 
we move through our world, our sense of who we are can never be ultimately defined. 
Of course, to say that my personal identity is fictive is not to say that it is merely 
fictional. Although, it is to say that who I am is made concrete only in identificatory 
acts of pragmatic self-assertion. Identities are fictive, then, in a sense we might call, 
following Heidegger, ‘non-genuine’.32 That is, a fictive identity is non-genuine to the 
extent that it does not and cannot ultimately answer the question of ‘who’ I am. It 
becomes inauthentic and non-genuine, however – that is to say, factitious – when I 
believe that it can or does answer this question. And that is what is wrong with the 
response of bad faith to the unsettling fact that my being is always and unceasingly 
‘in question’ for me, for in bad faith what I attempt to do is precisely convince myself 
that I am or can be ‘truly’ myself. 
As Sartre, in his celebrated example of the café waiter, demonstrates – in bad 
faith 
 
[what] I attempt to realize is a being-in-itself of the café waiter, as if it were 
not just in my power to confer their value and their urgency upon my duties 
and the rights of my position, as if it were not my free choice to get up each 
morning at five o’clock or to remain in bed, even though it meant getting fired. 
As if from the very fact that I sustain this role in existence I did not transcend 
it on every side, as if I did not constitute myself as one beyond my condition.33 
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One can trace in this passage precisely the kind of slippage that makes bad faith 
possible, between the above termed fictive as of self-interpretation and the fictional as 
if of mimetic performance. In this way, to quote the sociologist Erving Goffman, ‘one 
finds that that the performer can be fully taken in by his own act; he can be sincerely 
convinced that the impression of reality which he stages is the real reality’.34 In other 
words, while I can attain an understanding that my projects are both provisional and 
necessary in disclosing my self-interpretative commitments, I can also deny their 
provisional status by imagining them to embody attributes or qualities that I actually 
possess, such that what I am merely ‘playing’ at being comes to define ‘what it is to 
be me’ in some essential way. This is most evident in the case of social role-playing, 
hence Sartre’s example. In interpreting myself as a café waiter I must act as if I were 
one. And in acting as if I were a café waiter, I can easily believe myself to be one. 
This becomes bad faith precisely because in order to be ‘convinced’ by my ‘as if’ I 
must hide from myself the consciousness of my freedom – that is, I must hide my lack 
of conviction.35 For Sartre, that this slippage is possible owes everything to the power 
of consciousness to ‘derealise’ itself through mimetic substitution: ‘I can be [the café 
waiter] only in the neutralized mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by mechanically making 
the typical gestures of my state and by aiming at myself as an imaginary café waiter 
through those gestures taken as an “analogon”’.36 What remains to be answered here 
is how I can be ‘taken in’ by my own act. 
Let me suggest an answer to this by briefly running through some of Sartre’s 
principal conclusions. In a nutshell, bad faith describes an act of freedom that denies 
itself. This might appear incredible since it seems the only way I can deny my 
freedom is to exercise my freedom. But there is no contradiction here once we 
understand by this that freedom asserts itself surreptitiously in bad faith. Bad faith is 
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bad faith because as a suppressed consciousness of itself it exists nevertheless in a 
consciousness of this suppression. Denying that it is for itself it nonetheless posits ‘for 
itself’ the impossible ideal of being an in itself. Living in bad faith means, for 
example, that my being a café waiter rests on a denial that I have any choice in the 
matter, that I have no freedom to be anything other than a café waiter, even though, as 
we have seen, I cannot be a café waiter and that in principle it is always open to me to 
be otherwise. Yet despite this, Sartre insists, bad faith is not cynical. Existing in a 
consciousness of this suppression means precisely that this consciousness is 
suppressed. That is, living in bad faith is not something I consciously do to myself; it 
is a precognitive reflex belonging to consciousness as it turns away from itself in 
fleeing its own nothingness (freedom). I fall into bad faith as easily as falling asleep, 
says Sartre.37 However, unlike sleep, bad faith is not a state of consciousness but a 
fundamental attitude of consciousness – one that throws up strategies designed to 
preserve itself in bad faith. Once again, Goffman is useful in understanding how these 
strategies fabricate reality by distinguishing, metaphorically, between ‘front’ and 
‘backstage’ activities. The café waiter throws himself wholeheartedly into the illusion 
of his setting rather as the actor does on stage. The equipment and paraphernalia of 
the café are the means by which he demonstrates his competence or proficiency in the 
part he has assigned himself; they are like so many props by which he solidifies his 
identity. This illusion is supported and reconfirmed day in and day out by his fellow 
workers and by the customers who pass through the café – all play their part in 
sustaining the fiction that the waiter’s situation is his fate and destiny.  
 Hence Sartre says, at one point, a consciousness in bad faith constructs around 
itself a Weltanschauung. In as much as it constitutes an attitude, however, it is 
irreducible to this construct. Rather, bad faith is itself an original comportment or 
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project. It is a mode of consciousness in which consciousness appears to itself to be 
what it is not and it appears to itself to be thus ‘in all good faith’. Yet it is not quite 
sincere either: for a consciousness that is in bad faith can only be convinced by its 
own ruses if it renders all belief unconvincing – and so it ‘believes itself and does 
not’. In this way it arrives at what Sartre calls ‘non-persuasive evidence’, which is to 
say, it can persuade itself that it is what it is not only because it does not ask ‘too 
much’ of itself.38 Were its standard of evidence higher, were it actually sincere, it 
could not sustain the fiction that it projects; its strategies would crumble before its 
very eyes just as would its world. Let us take note of this crucial point for here we 
arrive at Sartre’s answer to the question of how bad faith is possible, and so, by 
extension, at the answer to the question of the possibility of the actor’s mastery of the 
paradox. Bad faith is explicable, says Sartre, only if it is possible to conceive of a 
belief ‘which wishes itself to be not quite convinced’.39 The condition for the 
possibility of such a conviction – self-neutralising belief – is this: I am not what I am, 
and so, I am not and cannot be equal to any particular belief I happen to entertain 
regarding myself. No belief deriving or sustaining the self-conception through which I 
interpret myself has the solidity of a ‘fact’. Sartre explains: ‘Every belief is a belief 
that falls short; one never wholly believes what one believes. Consequently, the 
primitive project of bad faith is only the utilisation of this self-destruction of the fact 
of consciousness’.40 To apply this to the case of the actor: it is only because he is not 
wholly convinced by himself that he can find a basis for convincing himself that he 
can be wholly other to himself. This ‘basis’ is the non-ground of his own being, his 
own nothingness. This is what the actor grasps and plays with, however inarticulately, 
and which allows for the self-conscious or ‘technical’ employment of the stratagem of 
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bad faith: the slippage of the mimetic as if and the fictive as of self-interpretation 
through which he is able to utilize himself as an analogon. 
 
There are two questions I would like to touch on to wind things up. Firstly, 
does this analysis signify that the actor is necessarily in bad faith? And, secondly, 
what light does it shed on the broader problem that can be identified with Sartrean 
‘freedom’? 
To answer the first question as a lead-in to the second: asking whether the 
actor stands in bad faith because his technique employs the same operation of 
consciousness by no means, on my view, necessitates his living in bad faith. Nor, 
however, does it prevent him from doing so. Certainly some of Sartre’s later remarks 
on the actor would suggest Sartre believed he was in bad faith, at least to the extent 
that he is ‘assimilated’ by bourgeois culture as a ‘solid citizen of unreality’.41 But this 
does not prohibit the opposite, either: could one not conceive of an actor of 
commitment? – Brecht certainly did. The issue at stake presently is, in any case, 
different: should the stratagem of bad faith put one in bad faith? To answer this we 
need to acknowledge a fundamental difference exists between the situation of bad 
faith and the situation of the theatre. It is the latter context that after all determines the 
actor’s deployment of bad faith. The theatrical situation – the situation of theatrical 
mimesis – is a quasi-situation and knows it. It stages a quasi-reality, dramatizes quasi-
problems, and demonstrates through quasi-evidence possible resolutions. What, we 
might ask, is the point of this apparently superficial and useless expenditure? Sartre’s 
answer: theatre is demonstrative – by its means we are brought to an explicit 
consciousness of the act. The act, he tells us, is – 
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[a] free enterprise (…) for this freedom to exist it must at least lie in the very 
elements of an act, which is a venture, has a purpose, is projected, is 
concerted. This, therefore, is what we primarily see in theatre: people 
embarking on a venture and performing acts in order to do so (…) every act 
comprehends its own purposes and unified system; anyone performing an act 
is convinced that he has a right to perform it; consequently we are not on the 
ground of fact but of right (…). This very fact brings us to the true ground of 
theatre, in which it is not what is going on in the actor’s heads that concerns 
us, but watching a conflict of rights.42 
 
Theatrical mimesis is connected ultimately by Sartre to the ethicality of one’s 
situation precisely because it places at the forefront of one’s consciousness the 
questionability of one’s very being. It shows – or at least in Sartre’s view of it – that 
living is a task for which there is and can be no bedrock of certitude, but is rather a 
void that I must fill. How I choose to do so matters and indeed profoundly so, as 
theatrical conflict – ‘drama’ – demonstrates: in order to justify my choices I must do 
so by means of my commitments – through my action and in confrontation with the 
situation in which I struggle to assert myself.   
An uncommitted life, conversely, is one that eschews the perpetual need for 
justification and elects instead for the soft option of rationalisation. It is a life lived in 
bad faith. Now we have said that the situation of the theatre is a quasi-situation and 
knows it. By contrast, the situation of bad faith is a quasi-situation that takes itself for 
reality. And this difference is crucial: for if the actor is the master of the paradox – is 
a master of the technique of bad faith – he is so not for the purpose of self-deception 
but for the purposes of demonstrating what is possible by acting it. The waiter, on the 
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other hand, is not the master of bad faith but its servant. The actor’s situation reveals, 
then, a fundamental disparity with that of the waiter’s: on these grounds at least he is 
not in bad faith in his deployment of bad faith. One might take this difference more 
specifically yet in characterising the peculiarity of the actor’s situation. Mastering the 
paradox means mastering the difference between one’s own nullity and the 
‘something’ that one has to be – the actor is neither one nor the other but falls in the 
space between. How might one define this ‘space’? In fact we have already said: it is 
the liminal space of play, the ‘gestic’. The actor plays his being in this space and 
simultaneously puts play at the forefront of his being. Regarding this observation it is 
worth recalling what Sartre has to say on the issue of play in Being and Nothingness: 
‘As soon as man apprehends himself as free and wishes to use his freedom (…) then 
his activity is play. The first principle of play is man himself; through it he escapes his 
natural nature’.43   
This does not, of course, prove that the actor is not in bad faith. What it does 
allow however is a new way of articulating the paradox of the actor. Just as the actor 
can provide a model for bad faith, so equally he provides us with a counter-model: 
what he shows is that – in play – it is indeed possible to master the difference between 
being and nothingness without annulling it. For this reason, the solution to the 
problem of Sartrean freedom, manifested in the paradoxes of ‘originary mimesis’ – 
and according to which bad faith is merely its inverted expression, inasmuch as it is a 
mode of freedom that wishes itself not to be free – one way or another proceeds to 
this existential insight, which is exemplified by the secret art of the actor. 
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